This paper focuses on the immigration-related demands currently being placed on local police in the United States, and the emergence of what we call a "multilayered jurisdictional patchwork" (MJP) of immigration enforcement. We report results from nationwide surveys of city police chiefs and county sheriffs and intensive fieldwork in three jurisdictions. The enforcement landscape we describe is complicated by the varying and overlapping responsibilities of sheriffs and city police, and by the tendency for sheriffs to maintain closer relationships with federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) authorities. We conclude by reflecting on the implications of the MJP-for immigrants, for their communities, and for the evolving relationship between levels of government in the federal system. 2
Introduction
This paper focuses on the immigration-related demands currently being placed on local police. We describe these demands and the response of local agencies with reference to two national surveys, one of city police chiefs and one of county sheriffs, and three in-depth local case studies. We offer, in short, empirical evidence of a much broader phenomenon that some scholars have dubbed "immigration federalism" (Huntington 2008; Schuck 2007; Motomura 1999; Spiro 1997; Skerry 1995) . Our findings suggest that immigration federalism, when viewed through the lens of local law enforcement, looks more like a patchwork of overlapping and potentially conflicting authority than a systematic approach to immigration enforcement.
The devolution of immigration policing powers was authorized by the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) passed by Congress in 1996. Under §287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), state, county, and city law enforcement agencies have the opportunity to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which allows them to partner with the federal government to enforce civil violations of federal immigration law, or in other words, to arrest unauthorized immigrants for "being illegal." There were no 287(g) agreements signed prior to the 9/11 attacks, but in the years since the number of agreements has grown, with 71 municipal, county, and state agencies currently participating in the program (ICE ACCESS 2010).
The IIRIRA does not require that state and local law enforcement authorities enforce federal immigration laws. Rather, it simply invites them to do so, in keeping with the constitutional separation of federal and local policing powers. In this sense, the opportunity for sub-national jurisdictions to engage in immigration enforcement represents something of an exploitable resource for local and state authorities. The debate over how to engage with the federal effort is being conducted at multiple sub-national levels-in state legislatures, county boards of supervisors, sheriffs' offices, city halls, and within individual police departments-with widely variable outcomes. Views differ considerably. Many large cities, for example, are opposed to enforcement partnerships, but they operate within a jurisdictional network that subordinates their policy-making powers to the state level. Sheriffs, who in many cases exercise considerable power over their entire county, add an additional layer of complexity for cities reluctant to become involved in immigration enforcement.
Because federal rules do not require coordination between the various and overlapping policy-making bodies, the issue of immigration enforcement has significant potential for crossjurisdictional conflict and overlap. Our findings suggest that these conflicts tend to create significant levels of uncertainty among immigrant residents about what policy approach prevails.
Overlapping enforcement authority also constrains some localities as they seek to balance enforcement options against their commitment to community policing. The uncertainty produced by conflict at multiple levels and the reluctance of many local governments and police executives to take positions ultimately leave substantial discretion in the hands of individual officers to stop, arrest, or inquire about immigration status. We dub this outcome a "multilayered jurisdictional patchwork" (MJP) of enforcement authority: an emerging, confusing, and often contradictory geography of immigration enforcement in the United States.
The trend toward devolution of central authority in immigration control is widespread and highly variable, a product of increasing levels of immigration and the limited capacity of national governments to control this flow (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000) . In this sense, the trend toward shared responsibility is not surprising: federalism is a familiar solution to the problem of limited governing capacity. As Grodzins (1966) stated in the mid-1960s, "It is difficult to find any governmental activity that does not involve all three of the so-called levels of the federal system" 4 (32). Grodzins (1966) emphasized the necessity for intergovernmental cooperation to achieve broader goals (see also Broughton 1943; Elazar 1966) . Immigration policy has not, until recently, followed the pattern of shared governance that Grodzins (1966) describes. Peter Spiro (2001) notes that "immigration policy [has been] a lagging indicator of general trends towards devolved governance" (73). This is changing as the federal government reconfigures long-standing policing relationships with local authorities, a reminder that there are few timeless truths where federalism is concerned.
In this paper, we contextualize our empirical findings in terms of the evolving literature on immigration federalism. Our findings are based on two original surveys of city police chiefs and county sheriffs nationwide and in-depth study of the issue of immigration enforcement in three communities: Mesa, Arizona; New Haven, Connecticut; and Raleigh, North Carolina. We conclude by reflecting on the implications of the MJP-for immigrants, for their communities, and for the evolving relationship between levels of government in the federal system. The emergence of immigration federalism, we suggest, raises serious concerns that may not be present in other areas of shared governance. Immigration enforcement devolved to the local level through cooperative agreements with federal authorities threatens to disrupt fragile trust, carefully nurtured over the years, between local law enforcement and immigrant communities.
Immigration Federalism and the Multilayered Jurisdictional Patchwork
Though a handful of scholars had previously addressed and explored the role of states and localities in immigration enforcement (Neuman 1995; Skerry 1995; Klebaner 1958) , Hiroshi Motomura (1999) is credited with coining the term "immigration federalism" in a paper in which he asks, "What role should states and localities play in making and implementing law and policy 5 relating to immigration and immigrants?" (1361). That question has become even more relevant with recent changes in the landscape of local enforcement. Contemporary scholarship explores two relatively recent emerging dynamics: (1) the devolution of immigration authority from the federal government to subnational jurisdictions that was authorized in 1996 by IIRIRA and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA); and (2) the recent explosion of "grassroots" immigration policies and enforcement practices. The most vigorous debates and extensive discussions of immigration federalism have taken place in law reviews. Legal scholars have, on the whole, divided into two camps: those arguing for and those arguing against the constitutionality and desirability of immigration federalism (see e.g.
Harvard Law Review 2005
). An early proponent of immigration federalism was Peter Spiro (1994 Spiro ( , 1997 who argued for what he called "steam valve federalism" in immigration policymaking.
Reflecting on California's Proposition 187 and the 1996 laws in Congress, and drawing a parallel to the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Acts in 1882 and 1888, Spiro (1997) argues in favor of statelevel immigration policy activism. As he writes, devolution:
presages new possibilities for state-level modulation in immigrant policy that will more efficiently represent wide state-to-state variations in voter preferences and that may ultimately benefit aliens as a group. First, state level authority will allow those states harboring intense anti-alien sentiment to act on those sentiments at the state level, thus diminishing any interest on their part to seek national legislation to similarly restrictionist ends (1627-8).
Under steam valve federalism, "one state's preferences, frustrated at home, are not visited on the rest of us by way of Washington" (ibid.).
Others have explored different facets of immigration federalism. Peter Schuck (2007) suggests that immigration policymaking at the state and local level will not necessarily be hostile to 6 immigrants. Still others view the devolution of immigration policing authority as a crucial "force multiplier" in the war on terror (Kobach 2005; Hethmon 2004 ), given that roughly 2,000 ICE agents were assigned to internal enforcement by 2009. From a slightly different angle, both Cristina Rodríguez (2008) and Clare Huntington (2008) argue for a more robust multilayered immigration regime. Rodríguez (2008) makes the case that despite de jure federal exclusivity in immigration policymaking and enforcement, we actually have a "de facto multi-sovereign regime." She and
Huntington both see "a structural need for federal, state, and local participation in immigration regulation" (ibid., 571) and immigrant integration.
Other legal scholars take a much more negative view of immigration federalism. Their principal concern is that devolution and the rise of grassroots immigration policy activism have opened the door to discrimination against noncitizens by local authorities (Pham 2004; Chishti 2002; Bosniak 1994; Motomura 1994; Olivas 1994 Olivas , 2007 . These scholars see in the devolution of federal enforcement authority an erosion of the traditional barrier against state and local discrimination on the basis of national origin that was imposed by the equal-protection clause of the Chishti (2002) and Pham (2004) , among others, also express concern that the devolution of immigration policing will do serious harm to police-community relationships. the openings that federal law provides for regional differences in the enforcement of immigration laws; the capacity within the system as a whole for local governments to adopt their own legislation, e.g. sanctuary ordinances in a number of U.S. cities; and the decentralization of federal immigration enforcement (now ICE, Immigration and Customs Enforcement), which provides regional directors with the leeway to develop their own arrangements with local governments.
Much of this literature has been principally concerned with simply documenting and describing the recent emergence of state and local immigration policies.
ii Varsanyi (2010a) categorizes them as (1) and enforcement (Coleman 2007) . Our analysis of the MJP, situated within the various literatures that bear on immigration enforcement and the broader issues of federalism, thus offers fresh insights into an emerging phenomenon with implications, not just for the evolution of American federalism, but for the constitution of community in American society.
Empirical Evidence of Immigration Federalism: Results of Two National Surveys
In this section we draw upon data from two surveys of local law enforcement executives to describe and explore this pattern of immigration federalism that has emerged in this era of formal devolution of immigration-enforcement authority. We surveyed police chiefs from large and medium-sized cities in 2007-2008 and in 2009-2010 completed a similar survey of county sheriffs.
The city survey was sent to 452 police chiefs in cities listed in the American Community Survey of 2005 as falling into the category of municipalities with 65,000 or more residents. These 452 essentially represented the universe of chiefs in cities of this size that have their own police departments.
iii After multiple rounds of contacts using Dillman's (2007) tailored design method, we ultimately secured a 52.4 percent response rate (237 cities).
iv For our sample of county sheriffs, considerations of cost and relevance meant we needed to narrow down our sample well below the roughly 3,000 counties in the United States. Because many counties have tiny populations and few immigrants, we chose to limit our contact to sheriffs in counties that met two criteria: (a) a foreign-born percentage of the population of at least 6 percent, as of the 2000 Census; and (b) at least 20,000 total residents. To this set we added seven additional counties that were slightly below the 6 percent threshold but that had at least 25,000
foreign-born residents as of 2000. Of the 449 counties thus selected (roughly the same number as of big-city chiefs), 252 provided usable responses, a response rate of 56.1 percent. We report some of the most salient findings below, comparing the responses of municipal and county law enforcement executives where possible.
Among local law enforcement officials, county sheriffs hold a unique position, as they are at once administrators (as head of a county agency) and politicians (since the vast majority of sheriffs-97 percent in our survey-are directly elected). The sheriffs' electoral connection, which does not exist for city police chiefs, may make them more responsive to popular pressures regarding immigration enforcement, whether the sentiment is pro-or anti-enforcement in a particular county.
The local immigrant population feels the effect of the sheriff's policies both directly (through enforcement) and indirectly (through jail policies). Most county sheriffs have both responsibilities:
(1) ninety-one percent of our respondents say that they engage in patrols and investigations in unincorporated areas, and sometimes within incorporated cities; (2) eighty-three percent also run the county jail system. In our sample, 78 percent handle both functions.
County sheriffs are also more likely than city police chiefs to formally cooperate with Table 1 shows the share of chiefs and sheriffs who said that their officers would typically attempt to check the person's immigration status, report the person to ICE, or both.
For both types of departments, this percentage tends to vary in accordance with the severity of the offense or situation. But as Table 1 indicates, sheriffs were more likely to report an immigration 13 enforcement-oriented approach in each of these cases. The consistency of this finding across scenarios lends support to the idea that there are significant differences in the field. Interviewed as possible victim of human trafficking 59% 59%
Arrested for a non-violent crime, with no prior record 51% 67%
Stopped for a traffic violation 21% 27%
Interviewed as crime victim, complainant, or witness 15% 20%
Note: Percentages are calculated as the share of respondents who answered "check immigration status" or "report to ICE" or "both" for each of these situations. The denominator includes "don't know" responses, but excludes "not applicable" responses and refusals to answer. For sheriffs, we omit all agencies that are responsible for jail functions only and lack a patrols/investigations function.
How do officers determine what to do when they interact with a person whom they suspect may be an unauthorized immigrant? It is quite likely that individual officers on patrol are either forced to develop their own standard operating procedures on this question, or will tend to absorb an unofficial "norm" from their colleagues and superiors regarding how to act in such situations.
When we asked respondents whether their department or office has an official policy instructing officers what to do regarding immigration status, over half of the city chiefs (51 percent) and 44 percent of county sheriffs said they had no such policy. Others said that they didn't know if they had a policy (1 percent of chiefs, 5 percent of sheriffs) or that they had an unwritten policy (9 percent of chiefs, 18 percent of sheriffs). Indeed, only 39 percent of chiefs and 33 percent of sheriffs have written policies on this topic. Although such street-level discretion can sometimes have beneficial ramifications for public service (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003), it is worrisome when questions of rights and membership of community members may depend on which particular officer happens to arrive at the scene. Many of these officers will be untrained on this topic, as well; fifty-one percent of chiefs and 59 percent of sheriffs reported that their agency has not offered training for officers specifically related to incidents or calls involving unauthorized immigrants.
The differences described above have implications for unauthorized immigrants, who may be treated quite disparately, depending on whether they happen to encounter law enforcement within a municipality or in a neighboring unincorporated area. The confusion is particularly acute for newly arrived immigrants, who are unlikely to understand the nuances of the multi-jurisdictional character of U.S. law enforcement. Unpleasant experiences or anxieties relating to police forces in one jurisdiction may affect their relationship or perception of local police in another jurisdiction, regardless of its policies. In that sense, fear of one particular police force acts as a sort of contagion affecting other communities in the area as well, as the case studies below illustrate. The county sheriff's authority to check the immigration status of all suspects transferred to their jail facility also can become the fulcrum for a heightened sense of threat among unauthorized immigrants throughout the county.
Case Studies
The case studies that follow further illustrate the variations in law enforcement approaches to immigration enforcement, even within particular cities and metropolitan areas. Based on the initial chief's survey and methodological and theoretical considerations, we created a fourfold typology of communities. The typology groups cities in terms of their responses to questions about their immigration enforcement policies. We then selected relatively typical instances of each of the four categories as candidates for case study research. What follows are brief analyses of three of these case studies that clearly illustrate the MJP-and its troubling contradictions, particularly for immigrant communities.
Mesa, Arizona
Mesa is a city of more than 463,000 people within the Phoenix metropolitan area. Along Brewer in April 2010, seeks to make this authority explicit and would require all police agencies in the state to prioritize immigration enforcement, allowing Arizona citizens to sue local police agencies if they fail to do so. SB1070 has been challenged in court, most prominently by the Department of Justice, and it is yet to be seen whether the bill (or portions thereof) will come into force.
The situation in Mesa thus aptly illustrates how federal devolution creates a multijurisdictional patchwork of immigration-enforcement authority. In this case, the conflict is between levels, with the county asserting its jurisdiction to patrol the entire county as it sees fit, regardless of the policies or wishes of cities within the county. In most areas of the nation, such conflicts are avoided through comity, a principal of reciprocity by which one jurisdiction extends certain courtesies to others by recognizing their laws and decisions. Federal devolution does not take into account the possibility that comity will be ignored and that policing agencies will come into conflict over enforcement policy.
The federal government's undifferentiated approach to devolution means that Mesa residents are unable, as a practical matter, to implement their own approach to community safety. It is not clear whether any political authority can control a sheriff's immigration-enforcement decisions. As popularly elected officials, sheriffs act relatively independent of their county governing board. Nor can the federal government be sure how its enforcement authority is being 18 exercised under current policy. A recent study by the Migration Policy Institute questions the ability of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to ensure that its stated priority of targeting serious criminal offenses will be honored at the local level (Rodríguez et al. 2010) .
New Haven, Connecticut
New Haven is a city of 124,000 people (21.4 percent Latino and 11.6 percent foreign born)
in southern Connecticut and is perhaps best known as home to Yale University. Over the last several years, New Haven has developed a reputation as one of the most innovative cities in the United States when it comes to immigrant integration strategies. The city's police department has a General Order that prevents police officers from inquiring about a person's immigration status or acting upon a National Crime Information Center (NCIC) "hit" for immigration violations, except when investigating criminal activity. Moreover, the city was the nation's first to adopt a municipal identification card, which can be obtained by any city resident regardless of immigration (or other) status and is accepted by the police force, many local businesses, and city government as valid identification.
Both initiatives emerged out of the efforts of a diverse coalition of interests. Two local grassroots organizations, Unidad Latina en Acción (ULA) and JUNTA for Progressive Action, Inc.
(JUNTA), joined with representatives of the New Haven police department, city government, Yale law-school faculty, members and leaders of the congregation of Saint Rose de Lima Catholic Church, and other community members to work out an immigrant friendly approach to local policing. They acted out of growing awareness that immigrants in the community were being victimized, in large part because they did not have valid forms of identification. A state law prevented noncitizens from obtaining drivers' licenses.
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The situation facing undocumented immigrants in New Haven at that time echoes stories in communities throughout the United States. Without valid identification, these immigrants could not open bank accounts and thus kept their money at home or on their person in cash. As they walked home from work on payday, they were being robbed and assaulted by criminals who saw them as 
Raleigh, North Carolina
Raleigh, with a population of 284,507, is located in Wake County, North Carolina. The
Hispanic population has grown dramatically over the past two decades, largely in response to the demand for labor in the construction and agricultural sectors of the Wake County economy.
Hispanics now comprise about 9.3 percent of the population. Neither the City of Raleigh nor its police department have a policy concerning immigration enforcement, but the Wake County Sheriff's Department does, having entered into a 287(g) agreement in 2008 in order to provide more authority for the identification (and potential deportation by ICE) of undocumented immigrants.
The combination of no policies at the city level and a 287(g) agreement for jail identification at the county level permits wide individual officer discretion in how to respond to suspected undocumented immigrants. Any police officer in the county can arrest and bring in suspects, knowing that arrestees will have their citizenship checked. The 287(g) agreement is thus a resource for any officer who desires to use arrest authority to the maximum to deport undocumented
residents. Yet the sheriff can correctly claim that his officers do not make most of the arrests, and therefore the department is not wholly responsible for checking on the possibility of pretextual arrests or racial profiling. Both city and county police agencies thus achieve "dual deniability"
regarding enforcement policy (see also Coleman, this issue).
Latino residents do not necessarily distinguish between enforcement agencies, nor does it necessarily matter in terms of one's likelihood of deportation. The situation has led many in the Hispanic community to become fearful of all law enforcement and government officials. A representative from the sheriff's office argued that there is no discriminatory intent involved.
Establishing the identity of all persons brought into custody is an important custodial function performed by those who have responsibility for running local jails, but North Carolina has made this more difficult for unauthorized residents. 
Conclusion: Immigration Federalism and the Contradictions of Devolution
Devolution of governmental authority, whatever its specific focus, creates opportunities for more variation in local policy regimes than would ordinarily be the case under nationalized policy.
Such variation is often celebrated as a way to better reflect the needs and preferences of local residents than a one-size-fits-all national policy, or as a way to experiment with new and different ways of carrying out public services. Those who argue for devolution of immigration-enforcement authority stress these qualities, suggesting that devolution should also be seen as a "steam valve," reducing pressure on the central government in a hotly contested policy area by allowing each locality to define its own approach to enforcement (Spiro 1997) . Such variation is certainly apparent in our surveys, where we find some localities embracing proactive detection and removal of unauthorized immigrants, while others espouse a "limited cooperation" or "don't ask, don't tell" approach to immigration status. Many others choose no policy at all, effectively leaving the decision of how to proceed to local police executives or even to individual officers.
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The implications for local governments are more significant than such a laissez-faire approach might suggest. The issue in this case is not so much a case of varying local "tastes" for a "public service," as in the public choice model of metropolitan political economy (Ostrom, Bish, and Ostrom 1988) . Rather, variation in approaches to unauthorized immigration reflects differences in judgments about whether some classes of residents should be treated differently based upon national origin and legal status.
Nor can immigration enforcement be easily grouped with policy domains like education or employment training. In these areas sub-national variation in policy, undertaken in the service of national goals, may be less problematic. Immigration policy, however, is an example of what Manning (1977) and others call intermestic policy, as it stands at the juncture of foreign and domestic policy. The implications of enforcement can be drastic at an individual level and significant at a community level, raising fundamental issues about who belongs in the community and who can remain (Provine et al., forthcoming) . At the same time, enforcement decisions can have international ramifications. This is also a complex area of law, one in which the expertise required to enforce standards is not easily acquired. The standards themselves are not even entirely clear to legal scholars, who remain sharply divided over whether local police can legitimately enforce civil immigration violations (Rodríguez et al. 2007; Kobach 2005; Wishnie 2004 ).
Nor does immigration federalism fit the usual model of "cooperative federalism."
Immigration federalism tends to bypass the traditional role of the state government in policy implementation in favor of local governments, who are in other situations thought of as "creatures of the state." Even at the local level, coordination among neighboring jurisdictions is lacking.
Cities appear to act in isolation as they decide (or decide not to decide) whether and how to participate in enforcement relatively independently of what other localities or counties in the region 24 may be doing. The decisions localities make appear to be more influenced by local political dynamics than by any objective "need" for enforcement (Ramakrishnan and Wong 2008) . Nor is there an effort to achieve any professional consensus among law-enforcement leaders in a particular metropolitan area regarding best practices.
The close to them, may be deported. The MJP means that no local government is in a position to allay that fear. Nor, under current devolutionary policy, can the federal government ensure that enforcement will protect the civil rights and liberties of American citizens and legal residents.
The federal government has remained largely silent regarding alleged abuses by local law enforcement when it has partnered with federal authorities to deport residents. At the same time it has sometimes responded aggressively to local policies of non-enforcement, as in the New Haven case described here. This combination of devolution of immigration enforcement to the local level, in combination with the federal government's own lack of consistent policy, has created a kind of non-policy policy in which there is no safe place for immigrants who lack secure legal status. The federal government has thus extended its reach, even as it has reduced its oversight.
